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Tunisian journalists benefited broadly from the
political openness which followed the stepping down of
former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, securing un-
precedented rights that empowered them to question the
political sphere. After having been hostages of  the most
repressive media system for decades, Tunisian journalists
gained essential rights as a result of  a largely successful
media reform that liberated them from the government
dictate. However, the empowerment of  the media com-
munity did not automatically lead to a new newsroom
culture based on professional media practices. The com-
plex and crucial issues at stake in the political transition
and the tough political polarization left the media com-
munity in limbo. The media polarization is a result of
the political divide but it is also in turn fuelling it. In this
heightened environment, facts are blurred with rumour.
The manipulation of  news by journalists for the sake of
their ideological agendas and allies friends is leading to
confusion and the return of  the old style media propa-
ganda. If  regulatory change is a difficult process, jour-
nalists’ identity change remains the thorniest challenge.13
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Political polarization
Since the departure of  Ben Ali in early 2011, the
Tunisian transition has undergone a shaky process.
Nonetheless, it succeeded in overcoming major obsta-
cles, namely the ratification of  the new constitution of
the country (January 2014) and the resolution of  an
acute political impasse without duplicating the Egyptian
scenario of  a military takeover.33
The deep political crisis that plunged the country into
a severe impasse in the summer of  2013 was dealt with
wisely by different parties. It led to a national road map
and finally the adoption of  the constitution and the ap-
pointment of  a caretaker government. The Tunisian
transition process proved again a successful model in
ruling by compromise for the sake of  safeguarding the
political process. The lessons from Egypt proved pos-
itive although not to the extent of  creating a genuine
culture of  consensus between the main two belligerent
camps and their supporters: the Islamic led government
and its secular opponents. 
The experience of  building a ruling Islamist-secular
coali tion in parliament was presented as the reflection
of  a national consensus on the critical importance of
compromise. However, the coalition did not secure real
support from its popular basis, often criticized as inef-
ficient and failing to respond to people’s expectations.
Nevertheless, the interim National Constituent Assem-
bly elected in 2011 remained the main and legitimate
34
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arena for political participation.34 This divide mainly
portrayed as a secular-Islamic arm wrestle is deeply
rooted in key aspects of  the transition: the nature of
the political system, the place of  Islamic sharia and tra-
ditions in the constitution and in everyday life, gender
equality and the role of  women among other crucial
matters.35
If  the consensual approach continues to prevail over
the political stalemate, it has not yet succeeded in cre-
ating a new culture, both at political and social levels. A
discourse of  eliminating ‘the other’, ‘the opponent’, ‘the
different’, is still triumphing over calls for unity and
compromise. This discourse threatens to undo the
achievements of  this transition. The two biggest parties,
the Islamic Ennahda (Renaissance) and Nidaa Tunes
(Call of  Tunis), the leading opposition party, are fuelling
this culture of  discord. The opposition’s politicians and
supporters are calling the Islamist “rats” and those on
the opposing side, the Islamic camp, retort by calling
their opponents “snakes”. The message strongly dis-
seminated by the two opponent camps is the following:
“us or no one else”.36
Both the two camps and their political representation
have their internal dilemmas that also threaten to quash
the transitional process.37 Nidaa Tunes, which includes
some of  the figures of  the old regime, is suspected of
trying to revive the features of  the autocratic regime.
In the opposite camp, the possible alignment of  the En-
nahda party with radical Islamic trends would lead to
35
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the failure of  its legitimacy and leadership. The govern-
mental reaction to the growing Islamic extremist threat
is largely viewed by its opponents as the main factor be-
hind the deterioration of  the security situation with po-
litical assassinations.38
The government is viewed by the opposition as un-
able and even unwilling to quell the terrorist threat. For
the secular opposition, the shallow response by the gov-
ernment to the extremist threat and the growing radi-
calization among the youth is the main reason for the
degradation of  the security situation and growing in-
timidations of  civil liberties. Topics such as “hotels
halal” and Islamic kindergartens are becoming favourite
topics for the local and international press.39
The failure to reform the security services is another
major handicap with the Ministry of  Interior divided
between factions loyal to Ben Ali and to Ennahada gov-
ernment.40 In the aftermath of  the military take-over in
Egypt, voices calling for a military solution in Tunisia
were high, alongside with fears of  a take-over by fac-
tions inside the Ministry of  Interior loyal to the former
regime who benefited from the growing despair and
frustration among the population. 
However, this political polarization that is often pre-
sented as a major struggle between secularists and is-
lamists, is criticized as a naïve perception of  the
complex democratic transition which ignores the social
fractures at the root of  many of  the current challenges.
The excessive focus on issues such as the status of
36
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Tunisian women and the problem of  growing radical-
ization among Islamist youngsters and the security
threats, overshadow the socio-economic tension at the
heart of  the 2010 demonstrations that led to the
regime’s overthrow. These demonstrations had their his-
torical roots in the social movements that erupted in
the rural regions and were severely repressed by the
regime years before the Jasmine revolution.41 The con-
sistent portrayal of  the Tunisian transition as a struggle
over the identity of  the country is considered by some
analysts as a distraction from more urgent matters,
namely addressing economic development, unemploy-
ment and poverty.42
The “minimal national consensus” described by
Dekhli as “the alternations between ephemeral mo-
ments of  revolutionary reconciliation and moments of
divergence where everything seems out of  control” is
an accurate depiction of  the state of  the Tunisian tran-
sition as one continuously swinging between hope and
despair. The transition is in its deepest sense “a process
of  complete rewriting, more so in the streets than in
parliament” of  the Tunisian story.43
Media Regulatory Reform
The question of  media power and the relation be-
tween media, especially the media elite, and the power
sphere is not unique to Tunisia and the emerging media
systems in the Arab Spring countries. The phone hack-
37
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ing scandal in the British press reveals the intricate link
between media and politics in one of  the most ad-
vanced media systems.44 However, the excessive bias of
Arab journalists in support of  their political and ideo-
logical allies threatens to resurrect the old tools of  prop-
aganda which prevailed under the former autocratic
regimes. For instance, the degradation of  the Egyptian
media into a tool of  blunt praise of  the new regime is
impacting the media environment in neighbouring
countries that face similar challenges. This extreme po-
larized media environment is threatening to re-impose
the unilateral media narratives, thereby ending media
pluralism, one of  the major gains of  Arab national
media industries that resulted from the political change.
Tunisian journalists were one of  the main commu-
nities to benefit from the gains of  the Jasmin revolu-
tion. They shifted from an extremely closed media
system where their role was restricted to reports on the
ruling clan, to that of  active providers of  information
empowered by essential rights such as the right to ac-
cess to information.45
The media reform was largely successful in disman-
tling most of  the oppressive features of  the former
media system. A consultative body (the National Author-
ity for Reform of  Information and Communications, INRIC)
conducted a revision of  the regulatory system govern-
ing national media. Major achievements included a new
press code (Decree 115-2011) replacing the old restric-
tive 1975 Press Code that ensures basic media rights,
such as journalists’ access to information, the confiden-
38
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tiality of  sources, as well as freedom of  publication
without prior license for print outlets and transparency
with respect to outlets’ funding, ownership, editorial
management, and anti-monopoly stipulations.46 The de-
cree 41–2011 provided journalists with an unprece-
dented access to governmental documents, which was
previously taboo under the Ben Ali regime. The decree
116–2011 established an independent regulatory audio-
visual body – the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual
Communication or HAICA – tasked with regulating the
industry with no interference from the government es-
pecially for state owned media broadcasters. However,
the reluctance of  the government to ratify these decrees
and especially to approve the establishment of  the
HAICA limited the efficiency of  this regulatory reform
as well as the ambiguity of  some of  new legal texts.47
The new regulatory body is yet to prove its ability to
exercise its functions against interferences that aim to
undermine its independence.48
Another major handicap is the legal uncertainty re-
sulting from the judiciary system which uses double
standards in dealing with legal cases against journalists
by applying both the new press code and the old repres-
sive penal code. In addition, the frequent application of
prison sentences for journalists and various intimida-
tions for allegedly offending Islamic morals or acts of
indecency is transforming the judiciary into the main
tool to quell press freedom.49
39
46 El Issawi b, 2012.
47 Freedom House, 2012.
48 Article 19, 2014.
49 Freedom House, 2013.
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The adoption of  the new constitution for the coun-
try (January 2014) represents a major step in protecting
media independence and rights although this was only
possible after concerted campaigns by Tunisian activi-
ties to guarantee its protection. These campaigns man-
aged to quell attempts to include provisions that would
have effectively reduced the powers of  HAICA by giv-
ing it an advisory role rather than a regulatory one and
by requiring its membership to be elected by the parlia-
ment, potentially leading to the politicization or mar-
ginalization of  its mandate.50
Tunisia media as a stage for political battles
If  opening up the regulatory media system is crucial
for opening the door to independent media practices,
it is not on its own sufficient to achieve any progress.
Building new patterns of  professional and responsible
journalism inside newsrooms is equally if  not more im-
portant. A new culture of  media production is the main
safeguard against the return of  old tools of  censorship,
self-censorship and media manipulation. If  Tunisian
journalists felt empowered as a result of  the opening
of  the political and media spheres, this empowerment
was mostly translated into a chaotic expression of
views, unfounded accusations and libel. It was not sur-
prising to see a call for killing a minister aired on a talk
show on one of  national tvs post uprising. This chaotic
media environment was a result of  the lack of  news-
rooms traditions of  professional journalism but also the
40
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sudden dismantling of  main bodies that used to oversee
national media, mainly the Ministry of  Information,
without the provision of  professional alternatives for
dealing with needs and challenges of  the media sector
in such a crucial phase of  the history of  the country. 
With the opening of  the private broadcast sector for
political reporting, national tv stations quickly became
the main spearhead of  the political polarization with
businessmen investing heavily in the war between “left-
ist tv channels” and “Islamist tv channels”. As an ex-
ample, Nessma tv, owned by the influential businessman
Nabil Karoui, and which was a broadcaster before the
uprising, is considered to be one the main media plat-
forms for the secular opposition. The channel was con-
victed for “disrupting public order and violating
morals” for airing the Iranian film Persepolis considered
by conservative Tunisians to be blasphemous. Al-Hiwar
channel, close to Nidaa Tunes opposition political party,
is strongly critical to the government accused by En-
nahda supporters of  calling for a coup. In the opposite
camp, pro-government tv channels such as Al-Mutawas-
set and Zitouna, are heavily engaged in defending the
government policies and discrediting its opponents.51
It is evident that Tunisian media, previously ex-
tremely monotone, developed into a pluralistic sector-
ing the post uprising phase, thus ending the era of  the
unilateral official storytelling. However, the excessive
polarization is seriously threatening this recent plural-
ism, a common challenge facing all post uprising Arab
media systems.52 Furthermore, this extreme focus on
41
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politics is fuelling audience scepticism towards Tunisian
media which is accused of  neglecting the essence of  the
uprising, that is the calls for social justice, by limiting its
coverage of  the daily concerns of  citizens for the ben-
efit of  the political and ideological divide.53
I will focus now on some of  the main aspects of  this
media polarization and its impact on the success of  the
media reform in the long term:
• the process of  freeing the Tunisian public media
sector from the control of  the government was to
a large extent successful. The attempt of  the gov-
ernment to appoint editors-in-chief  and managing
directors of  public broadcasters was decried as a
return to the governmental dictate over public
media.54 The operation of  choosing the heads of
public media by competition before independent
panels was highly praised as recognition of  the im-
portance of  a professional public service independ-
ent from the government. However, the
independence demonstrated until now in the public
media coverage of  governmental policies as op-
posed to the submissive style prevailing under Ben
Ali regime is perceived by the supporters of  the
government as an expression of  the loyalty of  the
public media to the former regime and not of  in-
dependent media practices.55 It is very crucial to
support the newfound independence of  the public
sector and to ensure that it is the expression of  a
cultural change inside these newsrooms and not
42
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that of  a political alignment. Changing the old
habits of  public media requires much more than
changing the leadership. It also requires a long term
process of  professional training to empower and
educate journalists. Furthermore, the new regula-
tory body tasked with overseeing public broadcast-
ers has yet to prove its professionalism and
transparency and its ability to act independently
from pressures or any other form of  political align-
ment.
• The poor professional skills of  Tunisian journalists
who have had to work for decades under the dictate
of  the regime is another major handicap that has
increased media polarization. The weak editorial in-
dependence inside newsrooms, the link between
the media ownership and the political sphere, the
chaotic situation that followed the dismantling on
the old media regime with the outbreak of  dozens
of  new projects and pirate tv channels, most of
them presenting an unprofessional media environ-
ment, all contributed to the exacerbation of  media
polarization and made it a serious threat to plural-
istic storytelling. Furthermore, there is no consen-
sus on the definition of  professional journalism for
Tunisian journalists, a large part of  them advocate
against neutral media narratives under the guise of
having to take a political stance during the transition
process.56
• Media polarization is fuelled by the repressive role
played by the judiciary which has become the main
tool of  intimidation for journalists through its use
43
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of  the old penal code to punish them. This situation
is leading to further divides inside the media com-
munity and is threatening to resuscitate the old habits
of  self-censorship among journalists due to the fear
of  being prosecuted. The threat of  being prosecuted
and ultimately jailed for defaming public officials, or
under other alibis such as insulting morals or Islam
makes investigative journalism a difficult task. These
restrictions are not only leading to a blackout on in-
formation but are also fuelling the political and
media divide as the judiciary decisions are largely per-
ceived as politically motivated acts.57
• Tunisian journalists have not been able to unite
around professional concerns and shared interests
that make them a distinct community from that of
their political and ideological allies. The plans by
the National Union for Journalists to create a new
self-regulatory body for the press would be an im-
portant step towards ensuring freedom of  expres-
sion is protected by journalists themselves and
dilemmas related to the exercise of  the profession
are dealt with at the professional level and within
the professions specialized bodies free from the in-
fluence of  politics.58
Conclusions
Tunisian journalists are major winners from the po-
litical openness that resulted from the fall of  the former
44
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autocratic regime. As one of  Tunisian journalists I in-
terviewed in my field research rightly commented, the
post uprising is witnessing the spring of  journalism and
the winter of  politics. That was in the first months that
followed the fall of  the regime. The reality today is dif-
ferent. It could be accurate to say that the media polar-
ization and bias for the service of  political camps could
transform this spring into a severe winter. 
The empowerment of  journalists as a result of  the
revolution’s gains should be used to construct a new
culture within newsrooms that breaks with the tradi-
tions of  the past, a process which should be considered
a major priority for a sector that was undermined for
decades. However, this doesn’t seem a major preoccu-
pation for journalists who advocate for the duty to take
sides in the heightened post-uprising political environ-
ment. This could be understood by the limitation of
journalists’ role to that of  the reporters of  the clan for
decades. An enthusiasm brilliantly expressed by a young
journalist I met in the aftermath of  the uprising and
who described his new role of  a political reporter as a
“dream”, that of  being finally able to work “like (the
French) Le Monde’ journalists”. For this young journalist
who experienced for the first time political reporting,
this was a development of  unimaginable significance.
The development of  advocacy journalism in the af-
termath of  the uprisings in the Arab Spring countries
is a natural consequence of  the shift in the role of  jour-
nalists from a mouthpiece of  the regime to having ac-
tive say on the content of  media messages. It is also
explained by the impact of  social media narratives in
influencing traditional journalists, in their attempt to
45
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copy the style of  bloggers who were celebrated for their
leading role in telling the story of  the uprisings while
traditional institutional national media denied their out-
break. 
However, this advocate journalistic role which be-
came one of  the main features of  the post -uprising
media systems has shifted from lobbying for the de-
fence of  rights and freedoms to embellishing the face
of  political and ideological allies, even if  serving polit-
ical allies requires the dissemination of  rumours and
media manipulation. The recent fall of  Egyptian media
into the old habits of  propaganda for the regime and
the exclusion of  dissenting voices best expresses the
dangers of  this blurred identity of  a journalist advocate.
For Tunisian journalists and their colleagues in the Arab
Spring countries, as well as that of  the unions and pro-
fessional bodies representing them it is time to make
the debate about journalistic professionalism a priority.
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